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Saxon: Environmental Law

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY v.
DEPARTMENT OF WATER: THE NINTH
CIRCUIT DISALLOWS FEDERAL COMMON
LAW NUISANCE CLAIM FOR MONO LAKE
WATER AND AIR POLLUTION
I. INTRODUCTION

In National Audubon Society v. Department of Water,! the
Ninth Circuit held the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA)2 preempted National Audubon Society's (Audubon's)
federal common law nuisance action against the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP) for polluting the water of
California's Mono Lake. a The pollution, increased lake salinity
and ion concentration, resulted from DWP's diversions of water
from four feeder streams since 1940, according to Audubon."
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Audubon's federal common
law nuisance claim for air pollution created by high winds combined with alkali soil from the exposed lake bed. Ii The court did
not decide whether the claim was preempted by the Clean Air
Act because it found a federal common law nuisance air pollution action could not properly be asserted. s The Ninth Circuit
1. 869 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1989) (per Brunetti, J.; other panel tnembers were Goodwin, J., and Reinhardt, J., dissenting in part).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). The FWPCA is commonly referred to as the Clean
Water Act which was codified as an amendment to the FWPCA in 1977. See infra note
126.
3. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200.
4. Id. at 1198-99.
5. Id. at 1199.
6. Id. at 1205.
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majority conceded there might be some limited federal interest
in the nation's air quality,7 but determined that the claim must
fail because neither the rights and obligations of the United
States as sovereign were involved8 nor was there an interstate
dispute that would make application of state law inappropriate. s
Subsequent to this decision, the California Supreme Court
rejected an appeal by DWP to review California Trout, Inc. v.
State Water Resources Control Board,1° a state appellate court
decision requiring California to recall and reissue DWP water
diversion permits after conditioning them to provide sufficient
streamflows for the fishery. Mono Lake benefits from this decision as decreased diversions will allow more water to flow into
the lake.l1
On September 22, 1989, Governor George Deukmejian
signed two bills, known as the Environmental Water Act of 1989,
designed to restore and preserve Mono Lake. Assembly Bill
144212 created a $65 million Environmental Water Fund. 13 As7. [d. at 1204.

8. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1205.
9. [d. A third issue on appeal was whether the district court, having obtained jurisdiction pursuant to removal (see 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1982)), abused its discretion by

deciding to remand the state law claims after the defendants deleted the original basis
for removal in an amendment intended to defeat federal court jurisdiction. National
Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged remand orders are not considered final for appellate review (citing Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423
U.S. 336, (1976) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1987)), but the district court certified the decision, making the order discretionary and reviewable. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at
1205. The Ninth Circuit upheld the order based on the pendent jurisdiction doctrine,
which supports giving a district court discretion to remand when the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction is inappropriate. [d.
10. 207 Cal. App. 3d 585, 255 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Jan. 1989) (water appropriation permits must be conditioned for compliance with CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5937, mandating dam owners allow sufficient water flow for fishery below dam). National Audubon
Society and the Mono Lake Committee joined Cal Trout as plaintiffs in this suit.
11. In a separate state court action, El Dorado County Superior Court Judge Terrence M. Finney, ordered Los Angeles to stop diverting water from Mono Lake until
March 30, 1990, so the lake's water level could be raised approximately two feet. Audubon and the Mono Lake Committee sought the preliminary injunction to stop the diversions until the suit went to trial. The Napa Register, August 23, 1989, at 29, col.2.
12. A.B. 1442, Reg. Sess., 1989. Assemblyman Bill Baker (D-Walnut Creek) sponsored the bill to amend section 11913 of the CAL. WATER CODE and to add sections 12303,
12929.10, 12929.12, and 12929.13 relating to water resources.
13. E. Robbins, Digest of Concurrence in Senate Amendments on A.B. 1442 at 2
(Sept. 15, 1989) (available from offices of California Assemblyman Phillip Isenberg).
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sembly Bill 44414 required as much as $60 million from the
Water Fund to be spent to preserve Mono Lake. lli This legislation ensures Mono Lake permanent protection by reducing the
amount of diverted water.I8
II. FACTS
Mono Lake, located in central California, east of Yosemite
National Park, is the state's second largest natural body of
water.17 Since 1940, the Los Angeles DWP has diverted water
from four freshwater streams that normally flow into the lake. I8
The diversions occurred pursuant to permits issued by the California Water Resources Control Board. I9 As a result of the lowered water volume, over 14,700 acres of lake bed have been
exposed. 20 The lake has increased in salinity21 because of the
freshwater diversions, threatening bird and shrimp populations. 22
14. Assemblyman Phillip Isenberg (D-Sacramento) authored the bill to add Chapter
7.7 (codified as §§ 12929-12929.47) to the CAL. WATER CODE.
15. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 12929-12929.47 (West Supp. 1990). Together, DWP and
the Mono Lake Committee may request grants to fund alternative water and power supplies for Los Angeles. [d. at 12929.22.
16. The legislation also states that it does not affect the rights or obligations of any
party involved in Mono Lake Basin litigation. CAL. WATER CODE § 12929.25.
17. Appellant's Opening Brief at 4, National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of
Water, 869 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 85-2046). The lake is a natural saline lake that
supports an abundant population of brine shrimp that feed a very large number of nesting and migratory birds. [d. The shrimp are commercially harvested by local industry.
[d. Mono Lake is also a major tourist attraction. [d. Annually, more than a million people visit the lake to enjoy its scenic beauty, to recreate, and to use it for the scientific
study of wildlife and geologic formations. [d.
18. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1198.
19. [d.
20. [d. Additionally, the exposed Lake bed is composed of fine-grained silt, clay, and
volcanic glass particles. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5. The particles contain various
soluble alkali chemicals that have precipitated out of the lake. [d. This material is
whipped by high winds, creating dust storms (fugitive dust) that degrade the area's pristine air quality and extend to nearby federally owned lands and the state of Nevada. [d.
21. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189
Cal. Rptr. 346, (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413 (1983). Mono Lake has no outlets. It
loses water only by evaporation and seepage. Natural salts do not evaporate with water,
but are left behind. Prior to DWP diversions, the natural salinity was balanced by a
continuous supply of fresh stream water. Due to the diversions, there is an imbalance
between inflow and outflow that diminishes the lake's size and increases its salinity. [d.
22. Appellant's Opening Brief at 4.
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In 1979, Audubon and others~3 filed an action in Mono
County Superior Court against DWP, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief. 24 The parties asserted several causes of action:
violation of the public trust,21i violation of CAL. CONST. art. XVI,
section 6,26 a quiet title action to establish public trust rights in
the waters of Mono Basin,27 public and private nuisance (from
mud and dust created by reliction),28 and violation of CAL.
CONST. art. X, section 4. 29
DWP cross-complained against the State of California and
several federal agencies. so The United States removed the action
23. Other parties included Friends of the Earth, Mono Lake Committee, Los Angeles Audubon Society, David Gaines, Charles K. Simis, Walter Hansen, and John Boynton. National Audubon, 869 F.2d 1196.
24. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1198-99.
25. [d. California acquired title, as trustee for the public, of all navigable waterways
and the lands lying beneath them when it was admitted to the union. The state has both
the sovereign power and the duty to exercise continued supervision over the trust. City
of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 363, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980)
(quiet title action brought against City of Berkeley and State of California) cert denied,
449 U.S. 840 (1980). See also National Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 433-41, 658 P. 2d
709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346. Parties acquiring rights in trust property usually hold them subject to the trust and can assert no vested right to use them in a manner harmful to the
trust. [d.
26. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1198-99. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 prohibits a
gift by the state of a state asset. It provides, in relevant part: "The Legislature shall have
no power ... to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money
or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever .... "
27. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1198-99.
28. [d.
29. [d. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 prohibits the obstruction of navigable waters. It

provides:
No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the frontage or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in this State, shall be permitted
to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required for any public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the
free navigation of such water; and the Legislature shall enact
such laws as will give the most liberal construction to this provision, so that access to the navigable waters of this State shall
be always attainable for the people thereof.
30. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1199. Before DWP filed its four count crosscomplaint, the case was transferred to Alpine County Superior Court. [d. The crosscomplaint's first count sought adjudication of Basin water rights as to all appropriators;
the second sought to quiet title to those rights. [d. The two counts named 117 crossdefendants, including all of the plaintiffs, the State of California, the United States Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and numerous private water users. [d. The
third cause of action requested the court declare that "to the extent that the United
States has jurisdiction over California's exercise of its navigation trust, Congress has consented to the impairment of the navigable waters of Mono Lake." [d. Finally, DWP
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to federal district court. 31 In order to facilitate remand of the
state claims, DWP sought to amend its cross-complaint to delete
the federal claim on which the district court found removal
proper. 32 Alternatively, DWP asked the court to abstain. 33
Audubon sought permission to amend its complaint to include a federal common law nuisance cause of action. 34 The organization claimed the lake is an "interstate or navigable" water
in which there is an overriding federal interest,31i and that the
diversions lower the lake volume, causing water36 and air
pollution. 87
sought a declaration that conditions at the lake resulted from California's exercise of its
police power, claiming that any nuisance at Mono Lake is attributable to the owner of
the newly exposed lake bed. Id.
31. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1199. Removal was sought by the United States
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442{a)(I), on the grounds that the cross-complaint named federal agencies. Id. DWP moved to remand but the district court denied the motion. National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water, 496 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
32. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1199.
33. Id. Abstention occurs when a federal court refers state-law questions to state
court instead of deciding the question itself. Abstention is recognized: (I) to avoid decision of a federal constitutional question where the case may be disposed of on questions
of state law; (2) to avoid needless conflict with a state's administration of its own affairs;
(3) to leave to the states the resolution of unsettled questions of state law; and (4) to
ease the congestion of the federal court docket. These various doctrines overlap at times,
and the courts have not always distinguished them clearly. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 52 (4th ed. 1983) [hereinafter WRIGHT].
34. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1199.
35. Id. The lake is east of Yosemite National Park and much of the surrounding
area is federally owned. Appellant's Opening Brief at 12. Also, the lake has been continuously used in interstate commerce. Id. Audubon also relied on Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) in which the Supreme Court stated federal common law to abate
a public nuisance in "interstate or navigable waters" is appropriate. Id. at 16 {emphasis
in Audubon's brieO. Also, see infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
36. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1199. Audubon maintained that if the diversions
continued, the increasing salts in the lake would destroy the brine shrimp and make the
water intolerable for waterfowl. Appellant's Opening Brief at 13. The organization argued that the CW A did not apply because the diversions were not subject to a federal
permit nor did the CW A regulate pollution such as creation of a saline environment by
the withholding of fresh water. Id. at 11-12. Further, CWA regulation of salt water intrusion was inapplicable because that is the "invasion of a body of fresh water by a body of
salt water." Id. at 24 {citing Glossary, Water and Waste Water Control Engineering at
319 (3d ed. 1980».
37. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1199. Audubon alleged that the strong winds
blowing in the Mono Basin carry dust particles thousands of feet high and miles away,
reducing visibility and air quality and threaten interstate public health. Appellant's
Opening Brief at 14. Audubon also alleged that the Great Basin Unified Air Pollution
Control District, which has jurisdiction over the Mono Basin, reported violations of national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards for particulates. Id. Also
alleged was that the District expressed concern for violation of sulphate standards from
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The district court granted both parties' motions. 38 Thereafter, the district court determined abstention would be appropriate. 39 The court ordered Audubon to file a state court action to
determine the relationship between the public trust doctrine
and California's water rights system40 and establish whether exhaustion of administrative remedies was a prerequisite to Audubon's suit" l
After the state issues were resolved the parties returned to
district court.42 DWP, joined by the State of California, filed a
motion for partial summary judgment directed against Audubon's federal nuisance claims43 and renewed its motion for remand to state court. H
The district court granted in part and denied in part DWP's
summary judgment motion. 4!! The court held Audubon could
state a federal common law nuisance claim for air pollution,46
that the Clean Air Act (CAA) did not preempt the claim. 47 However, the court disallowed the water pollution claim, finding the
FWPCA preempted it.4 8
precipitation of sulphates in the receding lake's water as sulphates pose a known health
hazard. [d. Audubon's brief further alleged that alkaline salt crystals are released as the
lake recedes and they have been found to be harmful to humans and animals. [d.
38. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1199.
39. [d.
40. [d.
41. [d. The court retained jurisdiction over the case during the pendency of the
state claim. [d. The state supreme court eventually reviewed the state action. The court
held the public trust doctrine was not subsumed in the state water rights system. Furthermore, the court held that Audubon was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before the State Water Resources Control Board prior to filing suit. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, (1983),
cert. denied sub nom. Los Angeles Dep't of Water v. National Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S.
977 (1983). The court construed CAL. WATER CODE § 2501 (West 1971) to allow persons
claiming that a use of water harmed the public trust, to seek a Water Board determination (including reconsideration of previously granted rights) of the water allocation.
However, claimants need not seek the remedy from the Water Board because the state
supreme court held the courts share concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board. [d.
42. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1199.
43. [d.

44. [d. DWP filed the second motion to remand because, if the court granted its
motion for partial summary judgment, no federal issue would remain to be decided. [d.
45. [d. at 1199-1200.
46. [d. at 1200.
47. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200.
48. [d. In addition, the court granted the motion to remand the state law claims. [d.
Consequently, the district court retained jurisdiction over the federal nuisance claim for
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In 1984, the district court certified the following questions
for interlocutory appeal: 49 whether the federal common law nuisance doctrine applies as a basis for restraining the water diversions;lIo assuming it does, whether it can be asserted in this
case;lIl and finally, whether the district court, having obtained
jurisdiction pursuant to the removal statute (28 U.S.C. §
1442(a)(1)), has discretion to remand this action to state court
after DWP deleted the original basis for removal in an amendment intended to defeat federal court jurisdiction. 1I2
On May 7, 1985, the district court issued a declaratory judgmentll3 holding federal common law nuisance applied to stateauthorized water diversions that cause potential air quality impacts but not potential water quality impacts. 1I4 California and
Audubon appealed the judgment. 1I1I Audubon, California, and
DWP appealed the questions certified for interlocutory appeal. 1I8
III. BACKGROUND
A.

THE CASE LAW

1. Federal Common Law

Justice Brandeis, writing for the majority in Erie v.
Tompkins,1I7 observed that "general" federal common law does
not exist. In Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch CO.,IIS decided on the same day, the Supreme Court acdust pollution. [d.
49. [d. Two of the questions, dealing with whether Audubon could maintain an action for federal common law nuisance to restrain DWP's water diversions, were certified
at the request of the State of California. Appellant's Opening Brief at 9. The third question, certified at Audubon's request, asked whether the court below, having properly obtained jurisdiction after the United States' removal, had discretion to remand the case to
the state court. [d.
50. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200.
51. [d.
52. [d.
53. [d. The district court issued an order for declaratory judgment pursuant to FED.

R. CIV. P. 54(b). National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200.
54. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200.
55. [d.
56. [d.
57. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts in diversity actions must apply state-created
substantive law).
58. 304 U.S. 92 (1938) (apportionment of La Plata River, an interstate stream, held
to be a matter of federal common law).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1990

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 13

216

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:209

knowledged that narrow areas remained where federal common
law may be created to protect a federal interest. 1I9 Federal common law is appropriate even though the Constitution or an act
of Congress has not provided specific guidance. 6o When disputes
arise between two states, for example, the holding in Hinderlider indicates it is inappropriate for the court to apply one
state's law over that of another.
Federal common law survived the Erie ruling, as the Hinderlider decision verifies,6! although many questions remained
about the situations in which federal law would continue to be
applied. 62 In two cases prior to Erie, the Supreme Court applied
federal common law to address interstate pollution. 6s However,
59. [d. at 110. "For whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned
between the two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the
statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive." [d.
60. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 315 U.S. 447
(1943) ("no consideration" defense not available to accommodation note maker in suit by
federal agency as note assignee). Justice Jackson, in an oft-quoted concurring opinion
wrote:
A federal court sitting in a non-diversity case such as this
does not sit as a local tribunal. In some cases it may see fit for
special reasons to give the law of a particular state highly persuasive or even controlling effect, but in the last analysis its
decision turns upon the law of the United States, not that of
any state. Federal law is no juridical chameleon changing complexion to match that of each state wherein lawsuits happen to
be commenced because of the accidents of service of process
and of the application of the venue statutes. It is found in the
federal Constitution, statutes, or common law. Federal common law implements the federal Constitution and statutes,
and is conditioned by them. Within these limits, federal courts
are free to apply the traditional common-law technique of decision and to draw upon sources of the common law in cases
such as the present.
[d. at 471-72 (citation omitted).
61. See WRIGHT, § 60, at 386-97. See supra note 33. After Hinderlider, several cases
applied federal common law in very specific areas where there was strong federal interest
and a need for uniform policy. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964) (federal common law applicable to United States foreign relations); Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (right of the government to control issuance of commercial paper). Also, in the area of maritime law, federal common law has
been consistently applied pursuant to U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, which provides that judicial power shall extend to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. See WRIGHT. §
60, at 391.
62. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) in which the
Court articulated that federal common law may be applied, "[i]n the absence of an applicable Act of Congress .... " [d.
63. In Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906), the State of Missouri brought suit to
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not until 33 years after Erie did a federal court, in Texas u.
Pankey,S" clearly invoke the federal common law nuisance doctrine for a public nuisance claim.slI The Tenth Circuit's holding
in Pankey followed the Supreme Court's rationale in Georgia u.
Tennessee Copper Co.ss in finding that interstate pollution
should be a federal common law matter. S7 The United States Supreme Court shortly thereafter addressed the vitality of a federal common law nuisance doctrine.

In Illinois u. City of Milwaukee,s8 (Milwaukee 1), Illinois
sought to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
against Milwaukee for discharging raw or inadequately treated
sewage into interstate waters. S9 The Court refused to exercise
original jurisdiction, finding the district court had jurisdiction to
resolve the matter because the dispute arose under federal law
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 70 The Court cited Pankey as the
restrain Chicago's sewage discharge into the Desplaines River. Missouri alleged the dis·
charge would eventually contaminate the source of its drinking water (the Mississippi
River). [d. at 517. In the second case, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230
(1907), the State of Georgia sought to enjoin the copper company from discharging noxious gas from their Tennessee plant. Georgia alleged the gas would, among other things,
destroy its forest, orchards, and crops. [d. at 236.
64. 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971) (Texas alleged New Mexico agricultural pesticides
were polluting state waters).
65. [d. at 236. Public nuisance is, by definition, broader than private nuisance. It is
"the doing of or the failure to do something that injuriously affects the safety, health or
morals of the public, or works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury to
the public." W. PAGE KEETON, D.B. DOBBS, R.E. KEETON, D.G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 90 n.2 (citation omitted) (5th ed. 1984).
66. 206 U.S. 230. The Court noted that Georgia, in its capacity of quasi-sovereign,
"has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and
air within its domain." [d. at 237.
67. Pankey, 441 F.2d at 240. The Tenth Circuit found, "[f)ederal common law and
not [state) law [is) entitled and necessary to be recognized as a basis for dealing in uniform standards with the environmental rights of a State against improper impairment by
sources outside its domain." [d. at 241. The court also noted that federal common law is
sufficient to deal with "alleged federal rights" until the field "is regulated by comprehensive legislation or authorized administrative standards." [d.
68. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). Illinois maintained the Court had original jurisdiction pursuant to U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. cl. 2, which provides: "in all Cases ... in which a State
shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction." [d. Also, 28 U.S.C. §
1251 (1982) provides that "(a) the Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of: (1) All controversies between two or more States." Illinois u. Milwaukee, 406
U.S. at 93.
69. [d. at 99-100.
70. [d. at 99. The Court determined that the question was "whether pollution of
interstate or navigable waters creates actions arising under the 'laws' of the United
States within the meaning of § 1331(a)." [d. The Court held that it did and that §
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controlling principle with regard to whether pollution of interstate or navigable waters created a federal common law action.
In Milwaukee I, the Court observed that federal common
law applied to air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects. 71 The Court noted several statutes72 indicative of Congress's concern for interstate water quality, including the
FWPCA.78 The Court found the remedy Illinois sought, abatement of the public nuisance,74 was not within the "precise
scope" of available remedies. 711 Further, statutory remedies were
not the sole federal remedies available to address pollution. 76
The Court acknowledged federal laws and regulations may
eventually preempt the field of federal common law nuisance. 77
However, until statutory preemption occurs, federal courts have
the power to hear federal common law nuisance suits. 78
The scope of the federal common law nuisance doctrine remained uncertain after Milwaukee I. In Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewerage System v. Train 79 (Jones
1331(a) included suits brought by a state. Id. As reviewed by the Court in Milwaukee I,
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) provided that, "[t)he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." The current version of the statute provides, "[t)he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." (Current version codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).
71. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 103. Douglas, J., writing for the majority noted, "When
we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law." Id.
72. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 101. The other statutes referenced include the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-70 (1982)), the Fish and
Wildlife Act of 1956 (16 U.S.C. § 742a), the Act of September 22, 1959 (16 U.S.C. § 760e)
and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (16 U.s.C. § 661). Id. at 101-02.
73. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
74. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 93.
75. Id. at 103. The Court did not indicate why the FWPCA did not provide this
remedy. It merely observed that the FWPCA's abatement procedure followed a "long
drawn-out procedure." Id.
76. Id. "It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal
rights are concerned." Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 103 (citing Textile Workers Union of
America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (federal common law is
remedy for labor-management contracts falling under § 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947)).
77. Id. at 107.
78.Id.
79. 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976) (federal common law precluded as compliance with
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Falls), the Fourth Circuit found that interstate pollution was a

necessary prerequisite for a successful federal common law nuisance claim. so However, the Seventh Circuit in Illinois u. Outboard Marine Corp.,SI determined that Milwaukee I did not require interstate effects.S2
The court in Jones Falls also held that federal common law
nuisance actions were not available to private parties. s3 The
Third Circuit, however, in National Sea Clammers Association
u. City of New York,s. found public nuisance actions available to
private parties. slI
In 1972, Congress amended the FWPCA.s6 After Milwaukee
I, Supreme Court decisions initially focused on the interpretation of the 1972 amendments, not on whether the FWPCA preempted federal common law. s7 Other federal courts, however,
continued to address preemption issues. In 1979, the Ninth Cirthe FWPCA 1972 Amendments).
80. See also Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492
(8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (federal common law nuisance inapplicable where no interstate
pollution) modified sub nom. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 543 F.2d 1210 (8th
Cir. 1976).
81. 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980) (Illinois sought federal common law nuisance remedy against in-state industrial polluter of Lake Michigan) vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 453 U.S. 917 (1981).
82. Outboard Marine, 619 F.2d at 628.
83. Jones Falls, 539 F.2d at 1006. See also Township of Long Beach v. City of New
York, 445 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1978) (relief under federal common law nuisance action
should not be extended to private persons); Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275
(D. Conn. 1976) (federal common law nuisance for water pollution does not provide basis
for invoking federal jurisdiction for damages action brought by private plaintiffs) aff'd,
573 F.2d 1289 (1st Cir. 1977).
84. 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980) (class action against government officials for ocean
pollution) rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1980); see infra notes 95-98 and accompanying
text.
85. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 616 F.2d at 1233.
86. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1982)). The 1972 amendments are commonly called the Clean Water Act. The amendments established a regulatory system making waste discharges into national waters illegal without a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. See 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311 & 1342. All discharge points are regulated by the EPA. 33 U.S.C. §
1311(e). "Point source" is defined as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance
... from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. 1362(14).
87. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rei. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976) (permit not required for federal facilities discharging pollution); Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (EPA Administrator
cannot allot states less than authorized federal financial assistance).
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cuit ruled88 that the CAA did not preempt a federal common law
nuisance action. 89 Earlier that year the Seventh Circuit, in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee 90 ruled the FWPCA, even after the
1972 amendments, did not preempt federal common law nuisance claims. 91
2. Federal Common Law Nuisance for Water Pollution
Eliminated
In Milwaukee v. Illinois 8S (Milwaukee 11), the Supreme
Court disallowed a federal common law nuisance action as a
remedy for interstate water pollution. 98 The Court stressed that
Congress intended to establish, by enacting the 1972 amendments, an all-encompassing regulatory program for water
pollution. 9•
Less than two months after Milwaukee II, the Supreme
Court ruled 9 1! that the FWPCA and the Marine Protection, Re88. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181 (9th Cir.
1979) (federal common law nuisance action by California against Nevada to enjoin the
development of a hotel-casino).
89. Id. at 193.
90. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979). Illinois filed this suit after the Court in Milwaukee
I ruled the district court was the proper forum for Illinois to seek abatement of Milwaukee's sewage discharges. See Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91. The district court found the 1972
FWPCA amendments did not preclude federal common law nuisance. Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298, 300 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Milwaukee appealed the district
court's holding to the Seventh Circuit. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 155.
91. Id. at 162-64.
92. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). This case culminated the decade-long battle between Illinois and Milwaukee over Milwaukee's sewage discharges into Lake Michigan. The Seventh Circuit's decision that the 1972 FWPCA amendments had not preempted Illinois's
federal common law nuisance claims was overturned because Wisconsin was discharging
pursuant to a NPDES permit. Id. at 308-12.
93. Id. at 317. However, this ruling seems to be fact specific: "We conclude that, at
least so far as concerns the claims of respondents . ... " Id. at 317 (emphasis added);
and " ... no federal common-law remedy was available to respondents in this case." Id.
at 332 (emphasis added).
94. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 318. The Court determined, "Every point source discharge is prohibited unless covered by a permit, which directly subjects the discharger to
the. administrative apparatus established by Congress to achieve its goals. The 'major
purpose' of the Amendments was 'to establish a comprehensive long-range policy for the
elimination of water pollution.' S. REP. No. 92-414, at 95, 2 Leg. Hist. 1511." (emphasis
supplied). Id.
95. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1980). See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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search and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA)96 preempted a
federal common law nuisance claim for water pollution in coastal
waters.97 The Court followed the rationale enunciated in Milwaukee II.98
3. Preemption of Air Pollution Common Law Nuisance Claims
Since Milwaukee I, the Supreme Court has not addressed
federal common law nuisance for air pollution or whether the
Clean Air Act99 preempts such an action. However, in New England Legal Foundation v. Costle/ oo the Second Circuit distinguished the CAA from the FWPCA finding a federal common
law nuisance doctrine based on air pollution still existed. The
court found it significant lOI that the CWA regulated all point
sources of water pollution;102 whereas the CAA failed to regulate
air pollution from every source. lOS
The district court in United States v. Kin-Buc l04 also reasoned that similarities between the two acts did not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the CAA preempted a federal common law nuisance action. 1011 The district court juxtaposed the
case's facts against the Act's provisions and noted the CAA created a complete regulatory procedure: various pollutants had
96. 33 U.S.C. § 1401-45 (1982).
97. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 22 (1980).
98. [d. The Court concluded MPRSA was as comprehensive as the 1972 FWPCA
amendments considered in Milwaukee II. [d.
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
100. 666 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1981).
101. [d. at 32 n.2.
102. [d. The Second Circuit noted that the Court in Milwaukee II also found this
point significant. [d.
103. [d. "[Milwaukee II}, found it especially significant that under the [CWA) the
EPA regulated every point source of water pollution. [citations omitted] Under the
[CAA], in contrast, the states and the EPA are not required to control efHuents from
every source, but only from those sources which are found by the states and the agency
to threaten national ambient air quality standards. [citations omitted]." [d.
104. 532 F. Supp. 699 (D. N.J. 1982) (United States sought preliminary and injunctive relief and penalties for FWPCA violations and damages under common law nuisance
for air and water pollution).
105. [d. at 701. "While the [CWA] regulates every point source of water pollution,
the CAA regulates only those stationary sources of air pollution that are found to
threaten national ambient air quality standards." [d. The court in Kin-Buc found the
CAA must be evaluated on its own terms; the proper test is whether the act applied to a
previously unregulated area. [d. at 701-02.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1990

13

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 13

222 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:209

been identified, air quality standards set, and enforcement procedures implemented. lo6 As the CAA addressed the particular issue under review, the court found it preempted a federal common law nuisance action under these circumstances. lo7
B.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Congress designed the FWPCA and the CAA with national
interests in mind. lo8 Each act gives the EPA authority to administer and enforce its mandates. lo9 Each act also provides for citizen enforcement. llo Despite similarities of purpose, the process
differs in the manner in which each act achieves national protection of air and water.lll
1.

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Congress enacted the FWPCA in 1948 to address national
water quality concerns.ll2 In 1972, Congress amended the
FWPCA, establishing a comprehensive regulatory program. 1l3
The amendments created a permit program (National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System - referred to as "NPDES")114 to
regulate waste discharges. lUi A NPDES permit is required for
every pollutant1l6 discharged from every point source,117 thus
106. [d. at 702.
107. [d. See also Reeger v. Mill Service, 593 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Pa. 1984) "[w)e find
the regulatory scheme under the [CAA) to be similar to that of the acts considered in
Sea Clammers, and ... apply the &dme principle of preemption." [d.
108. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) for Congressional intent.
109. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d). Examples of EPA authority to administer CAA are: 42
U.S.C. § 7408(a) (EPA issues air quality criteria); 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (EPA administers
preparation of, reviews, and approves state implementation plans setting forth air quality standards); and 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (federal enforcement procedures).
110. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 and 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
111. See infra notes 113-55 and accompanying text.
112. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155
(1948) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
113. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
§ 2, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
114. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982).
115. [d. at § 1342(a).
116. [d. at § 1362(19). This section defines "pollution" as the "man-made or maninduced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of
water." [d.
117. [d. § 1311(e). Point sources are defined as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
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forcing compliance with effluent limitations. Any unpermitted
discharge is illegal. 118
The permitting authority (the EPA or an EPA-approved
state agency)119 reviews the NPDES permit application and conditions it for compliance with FWPCA standards, setting forth
specific effluent limitations. 12o The Act requires the discharger to
submit monitoring data for review by the permit-granting authority.l2l The agency conducts additional monitoring through a
sampling program. 122
Section 208 of the FWPCA also addresses non-point sources
of water pollution. 123 Section 208 requires states to prepare basin or area-wide waste treatment management plans for areas
where water quality problems exist or are anticipated. 124 Nonpoint source pollution includes urban drainage, mining run-off,
agricultural and silviculture runoff, as well as "salt water intrusion resulting from reductions of fresh water flow from any
cause, including ... diversion[s]."121i
In 1977, Congress further amended the FWPCA.126 The
Clean Water Act (CWA) added section 101(g), which expressly
prohibits the FWPCA from interfering with state water allocaDischarges include "any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure,
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation or vessel or other floating
craft." [d. This definition excludes agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows,
dams and reservoirs. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(EPA Administrator did not violate her discretionary duty by failing to regulate discharge of pollutants from dams under a NPDES permit). Courts have, however, interpreted "point source" broadly. See United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368
(10th Cir. 1979) (leachate discharged from reserve sump due to construction flaws or
inadequate size were "point source" discharges).
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
119. [d. at § 1342(b).
120. [d. at § 1342.
121. [d. at §§ 1314(i) and 1318.
122. [d. at § 1342(b)(2)(B).
123. 33 U.S.C. § 1288.
124. [d.
125. [d. at § 1314(0. In 1987, the Act was amended to include section 319, further
addressing non-point source water pollution. Federal Water Pollution Control Act as
amended by Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, Stat. 7 (approved Feb. 4,
1987) (section 319 codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1982)).
126. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified at 33
U.S.c. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
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tions. lll ? Further, section 102(d)128 of the CWA requires that the
EPA study the relationship between water allocation and water
quality.l2II
2. The Clean Air Act
The CAA creates a regulatory mechanism to protect air
quality but does not regulate site-specific pollution through a
permit program. 180 The CAA requires the EPA to designate air
quality control regions. lSI Primary national ambient air quality
standards are established by the EPA to protect public health. 182
Secondary standards for any pollutant that may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger the public health are also established. 188
The Act further provides for uniform national standards of per127. Section 101(g) provides:
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to
allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be
superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter.
It is the further policy of Congress that nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been established by any State. Federal agencies shall co-operate with State and local agencies to
develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing water
resources.
Clean Water Act § 101 (g), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1982).
128. Clean Water Act § 102(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (1982). This section provides, in
part:
The Administrator, after consultation with the States, and
River Basin Commissions established under the Water Resources Planning Act shall submit a report to Congress on or
before July 1, 1978, which analyzes the relationship between
programs under this chapter, and the programs by which
State and Federal agencies allocate quantities of water. Such
report shall include recommendations concerning the policy in
section 1251(g) of this title to improve coordination of efforts
to reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for
managing water resources.
129. A draft report was issued in 1979 indicating four options were available to address water quality relating to reduced stream flows: (1) increased treatment levels; (2)
limiting diversions and consumptive uses; (3) augmenting stream flows; and (4) relaxing
water quality standards. EPA DRAFT REPORT, WATER QUALITY/WATER ALLOCATION COORDINATION STUDY (1979). The federal government has not responded to the options
presented.
130. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 7407.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2).
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formance for new stationary sources lS4 of air pollution,136 and
emission standards for mobile sources of air pollution,lS8
The Act requires each state lS7 to submit a State Implementation Plan to the EPA that implements, maintains, and enforces the ambient air quality standards in each air quality control region,lS8 If the plan meets CAA requirements it will be
approved by the EP A,ls9 If the plan is inadequate or is not submitted, the EPA must revise or prepare an adequate implementation plan for the state,140
Where regions exceed the mInImUmS imposed by the national standards, states must impose emission limitations on
sources created prior to 1971 in order to reach the primary standards within three years of state plan approval. lU Secondary
standards must be met within a reasonable time period,142 Areas
with air quality better than the national standards are subject to
the "Prevention of Significant Deterioration" regulations,l4s
Not all pollution emanating from all sources is regulated,l'"
The CAA only regulates emission sources that the state finds
threaten national ambient air quality,141i The EPA's regulations
governing the preparation and content of state plans l48 define
regulated area sources of pollution to include "miscellaneous
sources,"147 The Act purports to regulate particulates with an
134. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(3) defines a stationary source as any building, structure, facility or installation which emits any air pollution. [d.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 7411.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 7521.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) indicates that states have the primary responsibility to
carry out the Act's mandate.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(2).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 741O(c)(1).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 741O(a)(2)(A).
142. [d.
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-91.
144. See Costle, 666 F.2d at 30. Because not all air pollution sources are regulated,
(e.g., sources that emit small amounts of pollution) the cumulative effect on air quality
may not be adequately considered. See Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of
the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740 (1983).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D). Unlike the CWA, the CAA does not regulate all point
sources of pollution. See Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 n.2.
146. 40 C.F.R. § 51.110(h) (1989).
147. Id. § 51.100(1). The pre-1986 code, Appendix D, defined miscellaneous sources
to include fires, coal refuse burning, agricultural burning, and "other" sources.
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aerometric diameter of a nominal 10 microns or less l48 and fugitive dust149 includes some regulated particulates. lllo
Before 1987, states with rural fugitive dust areas could discount fugitive dust when developing and enforcing State Implementation Plans. 1II1 When the EPA began regulating particulates
on July 1, 1987, it categorized areas of the nation into three
groups.11l2 The Mono Lake area was placed in a group identified
as an area with a strong likelihood of attaining particulate matter standards. lila
Like the CW A, the CAA sets forth citizen suit provisions for
its legal enforcement. 11l4 Under both acts, the right to other statutory or common law remedies is not limited when enforcement
is sought. lllll Neither act specifically recognizes or proscribes the
pursuit of federal common law actions.

C.

FEDERAL DEFERENCE TO STATE WATER LAW

The federal government defers to the states in the matter of
water allocation. IllS Western water law is based on the doctrine
of prior appropriation under which water can be diverted for the
beneficial use of non appurtenant lands and priority of use is
based on the chronological order of diversions. 11l7 The doctrine
developed in response to conflicts over insufficient water supplies and the desire to develop the arid west. 11l8 California embedded this doctrine in its state water code. 11l9
148. 40 C.FR § 50.6(c).
149. Wind storms in the Mono Lake area cause exposed lakebed soil to contribute
to "fugitive" dust. See supra note 20.
150. See 52 Fed. Reg. 24,716 (July 1, 1987) (Proposed Policy Statement).
151. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1202.
152. [d. This was based on whether an existing state plan might require revision due
to the new regulation. [d.
153. [d.

154. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) and 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
156. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) (states can impose conditions on the "control, appropriation, use or distribution of water" in a federal reclamation project if not inconsistent with congressional directives concerning the project).
157. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709,
189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983).
158. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978).
159. CAL. WATER CODE § 1225 (West Supp. 1990). California also recognizes the riparian rights doctrine which gives owners of property contiguous to a stream the right to
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California owns title to its navigable waters, and the lands
beneath it, as trustee for the public. 160 This sovereign right includes the right to control water use and allocations. 161 Consequently, California has exercised almost exclusive jurisdiction
over domestic water use, unhampered by federal interference. 162
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A.

MAJORITY

1. Federal Common Law Nuisance Action For Water Pollution

With little discussion, the majority affirmed the lower
court's ruling that the FWPCA preempted Audubon's common
law water pollution claim. 16s The court reasoned that the Supreme Court had unequivocally declared l64 the FWPCA to be a
comprehensive statute preempting federal common law nuisance
water pollution claims. 1611
2. Federal Common Law Nuisance Action For Air Pollution
The majority determined that Audubon could not properly
assert a federal common law nuisance action based on air pollution. 166 The majority analyzed whether Audubon's nuisance action came within the "few and restricted" instances in which
federal courts are authorized to fashion federal common law. 167
reasonable and beneficial use of water on their land. See National Audubon Soc'y v.
Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 441.
160. See City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 327 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980).
161. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 at 657-58 (1978).
162. [d. The federal government holds implied reserved water rights for use on federallands. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (water rights for national
parks and monuments); see also, Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (water
rights for Indian reservation).
163. National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water, 869 F.2d at 1200 (9th Cir.
1989).
164. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981).
165. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200. Quoting Sea Clammers the majority
found, " 'the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely
preempted by the more comprehensive scope of the FWPCA, which was completely revised after the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee.' " [citations omitted]". [d.
166. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200.
167. [d. at 1201, (citing Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.
630, 640 (1980) (federal courts not empowered to fashion a federal common law rule of
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The court categorized these circumscribed instances as those in
which a federal rule of decision is required to protect uniquely
federal interests or those in which Congress has given the courts
power to develop substantive law. lOS
a. Courts Not Empowered to Create Substantive Air Pollution
Law
The majority found the CAA to be a comprehensive statute. The court reviewed the Act's provisions setting forth national standards noting two sections 170 govern the establishment
and revision of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS).l71 As Congress revised the standards for particulate
pollution172 the majority found the Mono Lake area probably
had an adequate control strategy.l78
10S

The majority concluded the Act empowers only the EPA to
identify dangerous or potentially dangerous pollutants and concentration levels. 174 It also noted the Act requires states to develop plans to implement, maintain, and enforce those standards.l7II Consequently, the majority determined Congress did
not authorize the courts to develop a substantive common law
for air pollution. l7O
b. Federal Common Law Unnecessary to Protect Uniquely
Federal Interest
The majority found that a uniquely federal interest warranting the creation of federal commpn law exists only in narrow
contribution among antitrust wrongdoers».
168. Id. at 1201 (citing Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 640).
169. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1201.
170. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(1)(A) directs the EPA Administrator to identify pollutants
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare and to issue
air quality criteria for them. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 directs the Administrator to propose and
promulgate "primary" and "secondary" National Ambient Air Quality Standards for pollutants identified under the former section.
171. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1201-02. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
172. Id. at 1202. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
173. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1202.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol20/iss1/13

20

Saxon: Environmental Law

1990]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

229

circumstances; in this type of case it would be limited to situations in which the rights and obligations of the United States
are involved or where there is an interstate dispute implicating
the conflicting rights of states. 177 Audubon argued a significant
federal interest existed in the Mono Lake area air quality in part
because Mono Lake is proximate to federal lands. 178
. The majority found Congress recognized "some" limited
federal interest in national air quality by enacting the CAA.179
However, as the Act reserved to the state primary responsibility
for air quality it concluded 180 there is not "a uniquely federal
interest" in protecting the nation's air quality.l8l Moreover, to
the extent that there is a general federal interest in air quality,
Audubon failed to demonstrate that state law was inadequate or
in conflict with federal policy or interests. 182 Thus, no rights or
obligations of the United States warranted creation of federal
common law.
Nor did the majority find this claim involved the kind of
interstate dispute that required resolution under federal law. 18s
Relying on two Supreme Court holdings, Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper CO.184 and Milwaukee 1,186 the majority explained that
the Court had extended federal law only to those interstate controversies which involve a state suing sources outside of its own
territory.18s As Aubudon was a domestic dispute, involving pol177. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1202. The majority relied on Texas Industries
v. Radcliffe Materials, 451 U.S. 630 (1980).
178. Appellant's Opening Brief at 15, National Aububon Soc'y v. Department of
Water, 869 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 85-2046).
179. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1203.
180. [d.
181. [d. at 1204. To reinforce its analysis the court added, "[a)lthough there might
arguably be some unquantified federal interest ... this ... does not necessarily involve
the authority and duties of the United States as sovereign to the extent that our federal
system requires that the controversy be resolved under federal law to the exclusion of
state law." [d. (emphasis in original). Hence, state law applied as the alleged federal
policies or interests and a state common law nuisance action did not conflict. [d.
182. [d. at 1203-04.
183. [d. at 1204-05.
184. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
185. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
186. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1205. "It appears that the Court considers only
those interstate controversies which involve a state suing sources outside of its own territory because they are causing pollution within the state to be inappropriate for state law
to control, and therefore subject to resolution according to federal common law." [d.
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lution from a California source, the majority found it was not a
"true" interstate controversy for which state law is not
appropriate. 187
B.

DISSENT

1. There Is a Federal Interest
Judge Reinhardt, dissenting, argued the majority erred in
assuming that a "uniquely federal interest" could be implicated
only where there was a "right or obligation of the United States"
or an "interstate dispute implicating the conflicting rights of
states."188 He reasoned the Supreme Court in Milwaukee I
found air quality to be a matter of uniquely federal interest189
and, absent a preemptive federal statute, federal courts are empowered to decide federal common law nuisance actions. 19o As
the majority did not adequately distinguish Audubon from Milwaukee I, Judge Reinhardt argued its lead should be followed. 19l
Further, Judge Reinhardt maintained the CAA provisions
demonstrated there "was a uniquely federal interest in air quality".192 He urged that the CAA was similar to the pre-amended
187. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1205. Because it did not recognize the federal
common law claim, the court did not decide whether the CAA would have preempted it,
or whether Audubon had standing to sue.
188. National Audubon, 869 F.2d 1196, 1207 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
189. Id. The fact that air quality is a matter of uniquely federal interest suffices for
invoking the federal common law of nuisance. Id. Judge Reinhardt relied on the Supreme Court decision in Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
190. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1207. " '[FJederal courts will be empowered to
appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance' .... " Id. (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 at 107). The federal interest established in
Milwaukee I was not affected by Milwaukee II. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1207.
Judge Reinhardt noted the later decision specifically dealt with preemption of the water
pollution claim due to the 1972 FWPCA amendments. Id.
191. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1207-08. Judge Reinhardt noted the majority
did not contend Congress occupied the field with respect to air pollution but rather declared there is no "federal interest" in air pollution. Id. He observed that while Milwaukee I involved water pollution and not air pollution, the Supreme Court relied on both to
support finding federal common law governed the need for a uniform rule of decision. Id.
The majority's apparent belief there was a uniquely federal interest in preserving the
nation's waters but not the purity of its air was ungrounded. Id. at 1208. Further, the
dissent faulted the majority for not revealing why water should be subject to uniform
federal law but air subject to a "patchwork of state rules." Id.
192. Id. (emphasis in original).
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FWPCA effective at the time of Milwaukee 1,193 and evidenced
as much a federal interest in protecting air quality as did the
FWPCA in protecting water quality before the 1972
amendments. 19'
2. Interstate Pollution Not Required
Judge Reinhardt determined interstate pollution was not
prerequisite to state a claim because a federal interest was implicated. 1911 He asserted the federal interest in clean air and
water is unaffected by state boundaries. 19G
193. Id. at 1208-09. "For example, for those types of pollutants regulated by the
CAA, it is the federal government, not the states, that establishes national air quality
standards." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7409). Judge Reinhardt compared this to Milwaukee I,
where under the FWPCA if a state fails to establish water quality standards the EPA
administrator promulgates one. [d.
Also, 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) regulates air pollutants emitted by mobile and
stationary sources that "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." Id. Comparatively, water pollution under the pre-amended FWPCA could be
abated when it endangered public health or welfare. National Audubon, 869 F.2d 1208.
Finally, "the [CAA) authorizes the [EPA Administrator) to bring civil actions for noncompliance with the Act [citations omitted) [and) under the FWPCA the Attorney General may bring suit on behalf of the U.S. for abatement of pollution." [d. (citing Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 103).
The dissent concluded that just as the FWPCA evidenced a uniquely federal interest
in water pollution, the CAA evidenced a similar federal interest in air pollution. Id. at
1208. As Congress has approved additional legislation in this area (reauthorizing and
amending the CAA and CW A and enacting the Coastal Zone Management Act, and the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act) the federal interest in clean air and
water has become even more apparent since Milwaukee I. [d. at 1208 n.3.
194. Id. at 1209. The majority found nothing in the CAA suggested Congress intended to rely upon a federal common law remedy for the Act's enforcement. The dissent
concluded that was irrelevant to whether a federal interest was involved. Id.
195. Id. Judge Reinhardt's interpretation is based on language in Milwaukee 1 in
which the Court held federal law " 'controls the pollution of interstate or navigable waters' and federal common law governs 'air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects.' " Id. (citing Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 102-03).
196. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1209. This was the Seventh Circuit's view in
Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 453 U.S. 917 (1981). There, the court stressed, "The Court's use of the'
term 'navigable waters' (in Milwaukee l) significantly suggests the breadth of the holding, for that term includes both the territorial seas and purely intrastate waters having
no necessary interstate impact." Outboard Marine, 619 F.2d at 626-27. The Seventh Circuit declared the need for uniform rules of decision is equally strong whether or not the
pollution has interstate effects. Id. at 628. See also National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City
of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1234 n.35 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on grounds of preemption
sub nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1990

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 13

232

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:209

As to the majority's finding that the controversy was
"purely domestic," Judge Reinhardt countered this was really an
isaue related to standing. IS?
3. Standing
Judge Reinhardt contended the majority confused the issue
of claim permissibility with the issue of standing. ls8 While the
Supreme Court has not expressly decided whether a private
plaintiff may bring a federal common law nuisance action, Milwaukee I suggested that a state complainant was not required. ISS
He found it significant that both acts provided for private
enforcement200 and reasoned that because private parties may
seek a remedy for statutorily prohibited pollution, they may also
seek remedies against pollution not addressed by the statutes. 201
Therefore, Judge Reinhardt concluded that the arguments weigh
in favor of allowing Audubon to pursue its claim.202
4. Preemption by Clean Air Act
Although the majority did not address the issue, Judge
Reinhardt found that the CAA did not preempt Audubon's
197. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1210. Even if interstate pollution were reo
quired, Audubon would meet the test because it alleged the dust polluted Nevada's air as
well as California's. [d. at 1209·10 n.5.
198. [d. at 1210. The opinion noted the majority did not cite authority for limiting
standing to states as parties, but rather, cited cases in which the state was a party. [d.
199. [d. " '[I)t is not only the character of the parties that requires us to apply fed·
eral.Jaw.' [Milwaukee l] 406 U.S. at 105 n.6. Rather ... federal common law applies
'where there is an overriding federal interest ... or where the controversy touches basic
interests of federalism.' " [citation omitted). National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1210.
Judge Reinhardt noted that in National Sea Clammers, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1980) the Third Circuit squarely held private parties may file federal common law nui·
sance actions. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1210.
200. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1210·11. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365; 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
201. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1211. Judge Reinhardt added that federal com·
mon law remedies, albeit not in the nuisance context, have been held available to private
plaintiffs, citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92
(1938). See also, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). According
to Judge Reinhardt there was neither supporting authority nor rationale to deviate from
the general rule that federal common law remedies are available to private parties. It was
noted the majority provided no reason beyond the fact the Supreme Court has not had
occasion to decide the question in a nuisance context. [d. at 1211.
202. [d.
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claim.203 Relying on Milwaukee II's preemption analysis, he declared that the statute must speak directly to the question in
order to preempt common law .. The CWA preempted feder.al
common law because it was "an all-encompassing program of
water pollution regulation."20.
Unlike the CWA, the CAA does not regulate emissions from
every source, but only from those sources found to threaten
EPA promulgated air quality standards. 2011 Accordingly, Judge
Reinhardt determined the CAA allows federal courts "to improve on [its] program with federal common law," as did the
pre-amended FWPCA.206
V. CRITIQUE
The Ninth Circuit's determination that Audubon could not
assert a federal common law nuisance claim based on air pollution was the heart of its decision.207 However, it is disturbing
that Audubon's federal water pollution claim was so quickly rejected by the majority. The Ninth Circuit may have had no
choice but to find preemption in light of Supreme Court precedent although this case exemplifies why the Court itself, may
have been too hasty in concluding the nuisance doctrine
extinguished.
According to Audubon, the Mono Lake diversions were not
subject to a NPDES permit208 and the FWPCA did not apply,209
203. [d. at 1212.
204. [d. (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 318).
205. [d. at 1212-13 (relying on New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32

n.2 (2d. Cir. 1981». Further, Congress has not amended the CAA to provide for a comprehensive regulatory scheme as it did for the CWA in 1972. [d. The CAA, like the old
FWPCA, focuses on establishing parameters for tolerable levels of pollutants in the environment, while the CWA focuses on regulating all discharge of pollutants. [d. at 1213.
206. [d. (citing Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 319). Furthermore, the fact the EPA regulates wind-borne air pollution was insufficient to conclude the Act preempts federal common law. [d. at 1214. The old FWPCA also regulated the type of pollution which the
plaintiff in Milwaukee [ sought to have abated. But, because the remedy sought was "not
within the precise scope" of those included in the FWPCA, and because the FWPCA was
not all-encompassing, the Supreme Court concluded the federal common law of nuisance
still applied. [d. at 1214.
207. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1204.
208. Appellant's Opening Brief at 11, National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of
Water, 869 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 85-2046). Because there was no point source
discharge, CW A permit requirements were not triggered. See supra notes 112-17 and
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making a federal statutory remedy unavailable. 2lo The Ninth
Circuit did not review the distinctions Audubon raised but responded summarily that the FWPCA preempted Audubon's
water pollution nuisance claim211 based on the Supreme Court's
highly criticized opinion in Sea Clammers. m
The majority's approach indicates an unquestioned acceptance and liberal application of the broad scope of preemption
that the Supreme Court set forth in Milwaukee II upon which
Sea Clammers relied.218 Unlike the instant case, however, Milwaukee II and Sea Clammers involved point-source pollution
caused by a NPDES permitted discharge,2U thus the CWA
applied. 2ui
A fair argument could be made that Audubon's water pollution claim was not preempted for much the same reason that the
claim in Milwaukee I was not preempted. lIls As the Act did not
address the issue under review there could be no preemption. 217
The Ninth Circuit's opinion suggests the end of the federal comaccompanying text.
209. Appellant's Opening Brief at 11-12. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(0 considers salt water intrusion resulting from fresh water flow reduction to be a non-point source pollutant although the CWA does not appear to provide an effective remedy. It merely provides for
identification and evaluation of non-point pollution sources with pollution control methods to be developed at a later date. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(0. However, Mono Lake's alleged
diversion-created saline environment was not akin to salt water intrusion. See supra
note 36. Consequently, it appears the CW A does not address the instant case.
210. Appellant's Opening Brief at 11-12. Citing United States u. Little Lake Misere
Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973), Audubon argued the Supreme Court has allowed
"interstitial federal lawmaking" where a statute fails to provide a remedy. Appellant's
Opening Brief at 34.
211. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1200.
212. Id. See Note, The Hazardous Waste Regulatory Programs and the Federal
Common Law of Nuisance: A Confusion Between Preemption and Codification, 45 OHIO
ST. L.J. 791, at 802 n.120 for criticism of this approach. Also, National Audubon, 869
F.2d at 1212 n.10, Reinhardt, J., dissenting, indicates the Sea Clammers holding seems
to extend beyond the Milwaukee II holding.
213. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. It has been observed that lower
courts seem inclined to "broadly" apply the preemption doctrine despite extensive criticism of the Milwaukee II and Sea Clammers holdings. See supra note 212.
214. The Supreme Court has never expressly dealt with a federal common law nuisance water pollution issue except where the discharge has been subject to a NPDES
permit. An exception is Milwaukee I, the parent of Milwaukee II, which was prior to the
NPDES permit requirement.
215. See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
217. SeeId.
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mon law nuisance action based on water pollution, regardless of
the adequacy of the remedy provided by the FWPCA.
Although the majority's conclusion regarding water pollution is understandable in view of recent Supreme Court pronouncements, its treatment of the air pollution claim cannot be
so easily forgiven despite the intuitive correctness of the holding.
The court's analysis of the air pollution claim is intrinsically 'peculiar because the air pollution claim was determined not to be a
matter of federal interest. 218 In contrast, the water pollution
claim was found to be a matter of federal interest, subject to
federal statutory law.219
The distinction the majority seems to have made between
water and air pollution actions is tenuous but noteworthy. The
fact the majority recognized there might be some federal common law air pollution claims with the requisite federal interest is
encouraging because the CAA does not effectively regulate all air
pollution, just as the pre-1972 FWPCA did not regulate all water
pollution.
However, Mono Lake's air pollution was not found to be a
matter of uniquely federal interest,220 which seems inconsistent
with the majority's reliance on a national standard221 implemented by a federal agency222 to conclude Congress did not empower it to enforce the CAA.223 As the dissenting opinion noted,
the Supreme Court in Milwaukee I determined air quality was a
matter of uniquely federal interest. 224 The subsequent holding in
Milwaukee II did not alter that determination,2211 so it is difficult
218. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1203. The Supreme Court in Milwaukee [
found there is federal common law when dealing with air and water in their ambient or
interstate aspects. However, the Ninth Circuit majority interpreted Milwaukee [ as find·
ing that there is no federal common law for rural fugitive dust. [d.
219. This inconsistency was noted by Judge Reinhardt, dissenting. National Audu·
bon, 869 F.2d at 1207·08.
220. [d. at 1204.
221. Some particulate matter contained within fugitive dust, such as Mono Lake's
. dust, is regulated by the CAA. National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1202.
222. [d.
223. [d. at 1201·02.
224. Milwaukee [, 406 U.S. at 103. The majority believed the Court's statement was
made in the context of water pollution and dust pollution was not addressed. National
Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1203.
225. Milwaukee II only dealt with the specific facts of the case, that is, whether the
CW A applied to a discharge subject to a NPDES permit.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1990

27

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 13

236

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:209

to understand why a federal interest was not found especially as
the CAA provides that air quality is a national concern. 226 If national interests were significant enough for Congress to enact a
federal statute then it follows that a federal interest must
exist. 227
Clearly, the Ninth Circuit majority thought the Mono Lake
controversy should be decided by the state courts. 228 It is also
clear that Audubon's air pollution claim was distinctly incidental to the water pollution claim with the principal goal being to
reduce or stop the diversions. The majority, albeit unexpressly,
may have identified this case as potentially raising a water rights
issue.
If the Ninth Circuit had permitted the claim it would have
had to decide what law to apply - federal law or state law. Application of federal law would have plainly interfered with the
state's right to allocate its water as necessary. Therefore, to hold
otherwise, the court would have ignored Congress's expressed
prohibition that the CWA cannot interfere with state water allocations229 and would have set the scene for federal interference
in an area historically relegated to the state. 280

VI. CONCLUSION
Although reinforcing the demise of federal common law nuisance actions for water pollution, the majority declined to nullify
federal common law nuisance actions for air pollution. If a
unique federal interest is found and the CAA does not provide a
remedy, federal common law may still be applicable.
The Ninth Circuit's decision was correct because a decision
for Audubon would have seriously disturbed state water policy.
A successful federal common law action would have meddled
226. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b).
227. Significantly, the Ninth Circuit did not find preemption of the air pollution
claim which indirectly seems to agree with the Milwaukee I holding, that is, if there is a
statutory gap and it is necessary to protect a federal interest, federal common law may
be applicable. However, in the instant case a true federal interest was not found.
228. See National Audubon, 869 F.2d at 1204.
229. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g).
230. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
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with the state's historic right to allocate its water as needed, a
major federal interference inconsistent with judicial precedent
and the CWA.
Although this case was an environmental defeat, the exhaustive battle to save Mono Lake has finally been won given
recent state legislation231 and court decisions232 which will alleviate the water diversion created problems plaguing the lake.

Beverly Saxon·

231. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1990.
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